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“It feels like there are 
hooks inside my chest”
The Construction of Narrative 
Absorption Experiences Using  
Image Schemata
Katalin Bálint and Ed S. Tan
Abstract: Narrative absorption is a spontaneous temporary change in the
state of consciousness due to an exceptionally intense awareness of a fic-
tional narrative. This article investigates the experiential level of narrative





resent the content of viewers’ and readers’ consciousness so as to identify









“And Tweety Bird runs and gets a bowling ball and drops it [down] the 
drainpipe”





how in retelling a film sequence a multimodal embodied representation is
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The present study makes use of 
people’s capacity to deliver an 
account of particular narrative 
experiences that are dear to them, 
namely describe what it is like to 
be absorbed by a fi ctional story.
constructed in the recipient’s awareness, somewhat 
similar to that of the teller during the actual Tweety 
sequence. People seem to be able to share the experi-
ence they had when viewing an attractive fi lm, more-
over, they fi nd fun in retelling because listeners enjoy 
it likewise. This article makes use of people’s capacity 
to deliver an account of particular narrative experi-
ences that are dear to them, namely describe what it 
is like to be absorbed by a fi ctional story. It explores mental models used in 
constructing the experience and conveying it to others. 
As an investigation of the fi lm experience the present paper draws on a 
rich tradition. The apparent realism of fi lm images has been regarded as the 
key to the fi lm experience in classical fi lm theory that also pointed at the 
complexities of realism.2 Psycho-analytically oriented fi lm semioticians have 
framed the fi lm experience or fi lmic state in terms of illusion and (disembod-
ied) reality (e.g., Metz 1982). In the past decades, cognitive fi lm studies have 
made progress in explaining the viewer’s experience of reality, fi rst by pointing 
at similarities between perception of the real world and perception of fi lm 
images and sound.3 Second, they have stressed the role of fi lm narrative in 
lending unity to perceptual experiences thus contributing to an experience of 
realism (e.g., Cutting 2004). Film narration plays on the same attention mech-
anisms as used in real world perception. Typical narrative procedures such as 
continuity editing, smoothly mimic attentional routines used in the percep-
tion of real world scenes and thus contribute to the viewer’s sense of reality 
(Carroll and Seely 2013; Smith 2011). 
Relative to its determinants or underlying mechanisms, the contents of the 
fi lm experience have received sparse attention in cognitive fi lm studies. Per-
haps it is accurate to say that what it is like to be gripped by a fi lm is left to 
other disciplines and to critical fi lm scholars whose interpretative accounts of 
particular fi lms or genres cannot do without such phenomenology. This article 
contributes to fi lling this gap. It reports an attempt to analyze the experience 
of being engaged, or as we put it absorbed in fi ctional narratives in fi lms and 
print. 
We found relevant and promising descriptions of what it is like to be ab-
sorbed in stories in the phenomenology of literary narratives and digital me-
dia. According to Ryan’s (2001) prominent view, immersion is the experience of 
“being in” an alternative world as if one were temporarily present in it, unme-
diated, sensing appropriate bodily feelings to the full, and in an unself-aware 
fashion. (For a related view of “being there” in fi lm, see Tan 1996.) 
Research in media psychology has spawned a wealth of related concepts 
capturing gripping experiences linked to narrative presence and apparent 
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A preliminary embodied  mental 
model for absorption was proposed, 
“Into Film” featuring  1) a sense of the 
viewer’s self being in the portrayed 
world, or 2) an awareness of moving 
from the outside of a narrative to the 
inside of its story.
realism. These concepts have been developed for the purpose of empirical 
measurement of immersion-like gratifi cations delivered by narrative in vari-
ous media such as television, computer games and fi lm. Among the concepts 
are presence (Wirth et al. 2007): transportation (Gerrig 1993; Green and Brock 
2000): empathy, immersion, and engagement (Busselle and Bilandzic 2009). 
Recently we have presented an integrative analysis (Tan et al. forthcoming), 
proposing that what these concepts have in common is that they are high 
intensity experiential responses to narrative as a guided simulation (Mar and 
Oatley 2008) in which the viewer or reader participates. We proposed to refer 
to this high intensity experiential response as absorption. Tan et al. (forthcom-
ing) examined a collection of measurement items from the media psycho-
logical research literature for their conception of the experiential nature of 
absorption. Implied conceptions could be summarized as a transition from the 
outside of a narrative to the inside. A preliminary embodied mental model for 
absorption was proposed, “Into Film” featuring 1) 
a sense of the viewer’s self being in the portrayed 
world, or 2) an awareness of moving from the out-
side of a narrative to the inside of its story.4
The scope of the mental model “Into Film” for 
absorption in a story-world is limited fi rst because 
of its origin in a closed collection of highly stan-
dardized experience labels. These labels are used 
in rating scales for empirical measurement, each 
needed to be recognizable to large groups of viewers, readers and users of 
digital environments. Second, the labels were synthesized at the highest level 
of abstraction possible to result in one single mental model “Into Film.” This 
article explores the experience in more breadth, as well as depth. A range of 
mental models of being or moving in the narrative world was investigated, 
and the structure of the models considered in some detail. It used interview 
data from fi lm viewers and book readers about the process of remembering, 
viewing or reading story scenes. The qualitative data collection was expected 
to allow identifi cation of various mental models and relations among these, 
and to explore similarities between the models across two media; print and 
fi lm. Moreover, the open data collection enabled us to capture the use of 
mental models as the participant engaged in the act of (re-)constructing an 
experience. Participants’ accounts of their experiences were analyzed using a 
theoretical set of candidate mental models, namely image schemata. These 
could be expected to refl ect elements of the narrative experience other than 
realism or gripping-ness as well. 
Thus the relevance of the study lies in its empirical contribution to a cogni-
tive account of the contents and structure of absorbed narrative experiences.















The analysis of narrative experiences used a particular conceptualization of 
mental models. In the past 30 years cognitive linguists and cognitive psychol-
ogists have developed the notion of image schema (Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987). 
These are mental models representing knowledge acquired in the person’s in-
teraction with the world. Freely quoting Johnson (1987) an image schema is a 
package of embodied knowledge, refl ecting regularities, patterns and gestalts 
that have appeared in one’s active experiences with things and events in the 
outside world. In contrast to propositional mental structures, image schemas 
are quasi-physical and multi-modally embodied, while lacking the detail and 
determination that “real” images have. They are more like gestalts than pic-
tures. Johnson (1987) proposed 27 image schemas—Container, Balance, Com-
pulsion, Blockage, Counterforce, Restraint Removal, Enablement, Attraction, 
Mass-Count, Path, Link, Center-Periphery, Cycle, Near-Far, Scale, Part-Whole, 
Merging, Splitting, Full-Empty, Matching, Superimposition, Iteration, Contact, 
Process, Surface, Object, Collection. Additional schemata have been proposed 
and identifi ed in cognitive linguistics since (see Hampe and Grady 2005). Im-
age schemata are not rigid templates but dynamic structures that adapt to 
the specifi cities of a given situation. Once in place they structure new expe-
riences in order to serve comprehension. According to cognitive linguists and 
psychologists, image schemata structure experience at the level of bodily per-
ception, movement and action. 
As pre-conceptual models they are used by developing children as concep-
tual building blocks before the onset of language use (Mandler 1994). Image 
schemas are tools for, rather than products of, conceptualization. There is a 
growing body of empirical evidence that the mind uses image schemas in 
forming concepts and abstract meaning (e.g., Gibbs 2011; Gibbs and Colston 
1995). Simple image schemas can be transformed and combined to form more 
complex image schemas (e.g., Gibbs and Colston 1995). For instance Source-
Path-Goal is an often identifi ed image schema consisting of a Path linked to 
image schemas for starting and end points, such as Start and Destination (La-
koff 1987). Finally, image schemas have also been shown to function as a basic 
structure in metaphors (Cienki 1998; Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987).
The opening quote of this article demonstrates the use of image schemas 
in embodied understanding of fi lm. Indeed, cognitive fi lm scholars have re-
cently identifi ed and analyzed the use of image schemas outside the verbal 
realm in fi lms (Coëgnarts and Kravanja 2012, 2014b; Fahlenbrach 2008; Force-
ville 2006; Forceville and Jeulink 2011; see also contributions of several authors 
to a volume edited by Coëgnarts and Kravanja 2014a). These studies show that 
narrative deployment of image schemas by fi lmmakers facilitates embodied 
comprehension of particular elements of the fi lm’s story-world, such as char-
acter subjectivity or emotion. In contrast, the current study aims to explore the 
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The current 
study aims to 
explore the 








role of image schemas in the (re-)construction of the narrative experience as 
a whole. 
The targeted experience may include understanding of story-world events 
and characters but has a much wider and more open focus. What we hope to 
discover is how image schemas are used for structuring the experience of ab-
sorption at moments that somehow stand out as intense and worth the while 
to remember and share. This aim inspired a few choices in our approach. First, 
in contrast to available studies, we did not analyze the narratives themselves, 
but reconstructions of (fi lm and print) narrative experiences as to the use of 
image schemas. Second, we invited participants to retell their experience of 
narratives and moments of their own choices.
Method
In order to explore the use of image schemas in reconstructing experiences 
evoked by fi lm as well as by written stories two-session interviews were held. 
According to the needs of the study we looked for persons who often experi-
ence absorption with fi ctional narratives and are willing to talk about their 
experience in a detailed manner. From 25 interviews, 18 were selected for the 
analysis, all with native English speakers. Prior to the interview participants 
were asked to list their top ten most engaging fi ctional narratives, either fi lm 
or written stories. The fi rst interview session explored the experience of two 
self-selected stories as they were remembered. In the second interview the 
participant was asked to retell their original experience while they viewed two 
segments of their own choice. The sessions lasted between 90 and 120 min-
utes. Verbatim protocols were derived from the interview tapes.
Analysis: Occurrences of Image Schemas
The measurement items used in the previous study to arrive at the global 
mental model “Into Film” were compared with the list of twenty-seven image 
schemas proposed by Johnson (1987). Four image schemas seemed to be re-
fl ected in these items, Centre-Periphery, Container, and Source-Path-Goal. In 13 
interviews out of 18 we found that construals of absorbed 
narrative experiences contained many image schema re-
lated utterances. 
In the following paragraphs, they are each briefl y in-
troduced and followed by example quotes from the in-
terviews. For each of the reported schema, we report fi ve 
to ten exemplar quotes. A more complete list can be ob-
tained from the fi rst author. Subsequent example quotes increase in complex-
ity of the image schema. Table 1 shows which fi ctional story (in which media 
format) was recalled by the participant during the interview from which we 
selected the actual quote. 
In thirteen interviews out of 
18 we found that construals of 
absorbed narrative experiences 
contained many image schema 
related utterances.
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Table 1. Summary of quotes as they appear in the present paper; the story title 
(author, year of publication) that was discussed in the quote; the medium of 
the story as it was referred in the interviews; and participant identifi cation. 
Quote Story discussed in the interview Medium Participant
[1] High Fidelity (Hornby, 1995) Book P24
[2] The Ministry of Pain (Dubravka, 2006) Book P12
[3] Angel: A Hole in the World (Whedon, 2004) Film P07
[4]; [9]; [16]; [18]; 
[23]; [25]; [35]
Mulholland Drive (Lynch, 2001) Film P19
[5]; [6]; [15] The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance (Ford, 
1962)
Film P17
[7] Moulin Rouge (Luhrmann, 2001) Film P07
[8]; [12]; [26] What We Talk About When We Talk About 
Love (Carver, 1981)
Book P22
[10] Oddkins (Koontz, 1988) Book P16
[11] Hobbit (Tolkien, 1937) Book P06
[13] Let the Great World Spin (McCann, 2009) Book P20
[14] Bullet in the Brain (Wolff, 1995) Book P16
[17]; [28] Night Train to Lisbon (Mercier, 2004) Book P20
[19] Pan’s Labyrinth (del Toro, 2006) Film P10
[20] Disgrace (Coetzee, 1999) Book P15
[21]; [29] Scott Pilgrim (Wright, 2010) Film P19
[22] City of God (Meirelles, 2002) Film P24
[24] Written on the Body (Winterson, 1993) Book P16
[27]; [30]; [31] Austerlitz (Sebald, 2001) Book P22
[32]; [33], [34] Mirror (Tarkovsky, 1975) Film P18
Note: The table contains only the titles that were referred to in the selected quotes 
for the present paper. An exhaustive list of stories can be obtained from the fi rst 
author. 
Centre-Periphery
The basis of the Centre-Periphery schema is that one’s body is the center and 
gives rise to perceiving other objects as near or far relative to the center (i.e., 
close to the core, or the edge of one’s world). A metaphorical extension is that 
“in my world some things, events and persons are more important than oth-
ers” so that they loom larger in experience (Johnson 1987: 124). Examples in 
everyday language use are, “My brother and I are very close”; and “He seemed 
distant.” This schema emerged regularly in the analyzed construals.
[1] “so you kind of feel a little bit closer to the character within the book.” 
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This viewer seems to regard the character as mattering most. Another par-
ticipant experiences the story world as most important when telling about 
the experience: 
[2] “at that point I think I sort of felt like I had taken a step away from 
the story.” 
More than in [1] the use of the CP schema in [2] may also refl ect the expe-
rience as a more literal spatial description if “story” is taken as “story world”
[3] “but it felt like someone you love being pulled away from you ever so 
slowly, agonizingly slowly, watching someone you love being tortured 
and then just having her gone, it was quite horrible. I mean what was 
in my soul, it’s probably the best description I can give you, it’s like a 
massive loss.” 
Here the reference is more complex, a dynamic element being added to the 
image of a center and a periphery as spatial entities. In quote [3] a force moves 
the character from center to periphery. An even more complex conceptualiza-
tion can be seen if “someone you love” is experientially “close to the self.” If so, 
force needs to be stronger, or opposite forces are involved (“massive”; “pulled 
away”).
Container
The Container schema establishes in-out orientations in interactions with the 
world. Its experiential basis is in spatial boundedness of perceptions distin-
guishing an interior from an exterior space (Lakoff 1987: 272). Being held in a 
three-dimensional enclosure is considered a grounding experience (Johnson 
1987: 21–22). Its implications include fi rst shielding and - metaphorically pro-
tecting from external forces. Second, one’s fi xing of location and restriction of 
movement within the enclosure—metaphorically being locked in (e.g., “She 
came out of her depression”). Third, ties among elements “inside” the con-
tainer are metaphorically projected to convey belongingness or bonding (e.g., 
“He fell in love with her”; “We kicked him out of the club”; “I’d fallen out with 
my parents”). The quotes we found refl ect the use of the schema to construct 
the experience as the viewer’s self being contained by the narrative. This use of 
the Container schema was found ubiquitous in the interviews. A fi rst function 
is to convey the boundary between in and outside, and entrance of the self 
into the inside: 
[4] “Just yeah, more in the movie than outside the movie.” 
[5] “Yes, so you’re in the moment, just in the fi lm, I know people talk 
about switching off and that but it’s more than that, you just become 
involved in that fi lm and what’s happening.” 
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Figure 1. Front cover 
What We Talk about 
When We Talk about 
Love (Carver, 2009).
Three-dimensional enclosure of the viewer’s self can 
be seen in [5] to [7]: 
  [6] “you’re just enveloped in the fi lm so you’re 
in the moment.” 
 [7] “it holds your attention.” 
A more complex use of the schema seems to add 
movement of the self and directionality to it: 
  [8] “the deeper you get into the story the more 
shocking people’s responses are, . . . it’s a de-
scent, it really does feel like you’re descending 
into something, and then when the story’s over 
you get some kind of come up for air.” . . . “I feel 
like I’m sinking deeper into something.”
Another complexity is a reversal of self and fi lm where 
the self contains the fi lm.
  [9] “it’s almost like a nightmare that comes in 
your own head.”
Source-Path-Goal
The Source-Path-Goal schema (Johnson 1987: 113–117)5 underlies our un-
derstanding of embodied motion along a trajectory, from a starting point, 
through a series of physical steps to an end point. By metaphorical extension 
involving a mapping of desired states or purposes on end points, the schema 
helps in understanding notions like progress, journey, and achievement, for ex-
ample, “She has just started out to make a fortune”; “Jane has side-tracked in 
her search for self-understanding.”
The schema is often used by interviewees in the construal of the self as 
moving from outside into the story-world. 
[10] “to get into the story.”
It seems that here the Source-Path-Goal schema is superimposed onto a 
Container schema. As Lakoff and Nuñez (2000) have pointed out the “into” 
signals a schema characterized by an interior where an endpoint is located. 
The endpoint is made more explicit in [11]:
[11] “I was astounded at the way you can walk in—almost walk into a 
book and just live in it.”
The desirability of the end point, rendering it metaphorically a destination was 
made explicit in some cases:
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Figure 2. The Man 
Who Shot Liberty 
Valance (1962).
[12] “going to a place where you had never been yet but might be curious 
about or had heard something about.” 
[13] “The writer did a wonderful job of transporting me into the worlds 
of half a dozen different people, totally different from mine, outside my 
experience, but somehow I made them all real.” 
This quote also refl ects that getting close to believable characters in 
the story world is a desirable end state. Moreover it lends complexity to the 
schema as a movement from starting to end point construed as caused by an 
author. A similar cause is expressed in 
[14] “you’re following the character”
and a variant of this is in 
[15] “So you do feel like you’ve been on the trip with them actually.”
which explicitly metaphorizes the image schema to a journey. 
Force
“Force” (Johnson 1987: 42–48)6 is perhaps the clearest example of the embod-
ied nature of image schemata. It can only arise in the person’s physical interac-
tion with the environment. Directionality and power or intensity are its main 
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Figure 3. Scott 
Pilgrim vs. the World 
(2010).
features. Force is usually part of Source-Path-Goal schema: directionality is 
implemented through a path of motion, from a source to a target. In this way 
Force is the cause of motion, resulting in a sequence of initiation and actual 
motion through subsequent steps from source to target. Quotes from [13] to 
[15] above referring to a Source-Path-Goal schema appear to imply Force, [13] 
most explicitly (“Transport” being a transitive verb).
Force schemas have subforms including Compulsion, Blockage, Counter-
force, Diversion, Removal of restraint, Enablement and Attraction (Johnson 
1987). For instance, [14] suggested Attraction, and [13] Compulsion.
Also because of Force’s fi t within the Source-Path-Goal schema, in the anal-
ysis instances of Force were quite common, and by far the most of these had 
the form of Attraction, the viewer’s self being pulled into the fi lm.
[16] “it does pull me in, it pulls me back in at certain points, and when I’m 
pulled in I can’t really pay as much attention to what’s happening.” 
[17] “It drew me in again further, fascinated.”
[18] “I was so wrapped up in the movie I forgot to pause on the man 
itself.” 
[19] “and I get caught up in it.” 
[20] “it’s very gripping.” 
[21] “ that captured me in a way that some movies don’t.” 
[22] “it kind of sucks you in.” 
[23] “and that kind of further ties me in.” 
[24] “being really, really hooked into the story.” 
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Several complexities were identifi ed in the use of the Force schema. First, the 
mental model may be detailed beyond the mere Gestalt-like image schema 
such as in 
[25] “it feels like there are hooks inside my chest that are like.”
Such detailing exceeds the precision of the embodied representation of the 
image schema it extends upon. The extension is metaphoric as another source 
domain is mapped onto the primary image schema. In [25] it may be the butch-
ery domain with templates such as meat, fl esh, hooks, and knives.
Second, the role of the self vis-à-vis the cause of the motion may be repre-
sented in an embodied way starting from the Force schema.
[26] “that I think as a reader brings you right there immediately” “. . . he 
also has a way of dragging you in.” 
[27] “travelling through time, I think, as, I don’t know if that’s intentional 
but that’s what happens to me, is he takes you from one era to the next 
in one sentence.” 
In both cases it is the author of the story that is construed as the Force 
causing the motion. Quote [27] exhibits a most complex use of the Source-
Path-Goal schema with the author as the cause of movement within the 
story-world as container and the self as dependent on the author’s will.
[28] “Where is he taking me, where is the author taking me?” 
goes one step further in constructing the viewer/ reader as a helpless (“dan-
gling”) self at mercy of the author as an external force.
Ambiguity as to the role of self and the author exerting Force is suggested 
in
[29] “it’s completely grabbed me or I almost feel it’s more internal than 
an external force.” 
We also met with construals of an experience involving release or surrender to 
the author as a Force:
[30] “And once that is there then it’s very easy for me to let everything 
go and just feel more and more drawn in like literally like someone has 
a rope attached to me and they’re tugging me along, then I go quite 
willingly, I don’t really fi ght it.” 
Here subschemas Blocking (“rope attached to me”), Counterforce (“tug-
ging me”), and Removal of restraint (“quite willingly”) with the self as the actor 
seem operative in a series of causal steps.
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Figure 4: Front cover 
Austerlitz (Sebald, 
2011). 
Other complex uses of the Force schema re-
fl ect the experience of tension or confl ict in ab-
sorbed viewing or reading due to the confl ict 
that a story-world protagonist faces: 
  [31] “but he draws that, draws you into 
that, that scene makes you feel that, this, 
what I think would be the same way as the 
main character being confronted with that 
situation.” 
We consider that the desirability of the Target 
or Goal can be ambiguous to the interviewee. Be-
ing deeply into the story-world can mean partici-
pation in a painful situation. The author’s control 
of the viewer or reader’s self is construed here as 
a compelling Force, and perhaps a Counterforce 
constituted by the viewer’s or reader’s reactance 
is implied.
It seems as though, Force is not only at the 
basis of the self’s movement into the innermost 
parts of the story-world. The next quote seems to 
refer to catharsis of some kind, featuring the self as a Container from which 
(“bad = heavy”) contents are released. The release involves a Removal of re-
straint and hence Force: 
[32] “It’s a very strange feeling of almost purging of things, or that you’re 
lighter for lack of a better word.” 
And a similar embodied mental model featuring forcefully letting out or 
venting emotions, probably in identifying with a character is in
[33] “the emotional reaction that I had was one of not relief but just an 
up-roaring of emotion in general, when someone else is able to pour 
their feelings out, I think the natural response is to pour your own,”; and
[34] “You feel unselfed in a way, it’s an emptying out, it’s not a sentimen-
tal form of crying, it’s a very strange feeling, I fi nd.”
In the latter case it is the self that is removed, and the interviewee expe-
riences a kind of estrangement due to this removal. It can be argued that the 
quotes referring to a catharsis fi gure do not necessarily refl ect Force. They can 
be taken to refl ect a Container schema with a substance moving from inside to 
outside due to an unspecifi ed cause. However, we would argue that the notion 
of pressure exerted from inside a container by emotional content is a wide-
spread embodied metaphor (Kövecses 2000) for inner feeling. It can be argued 
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Figure 5. Mulholland 
Drive (2001).in addition that [32] and [33] imply an image schema Excess, exerting force 
from inside to outside (see Peña 2000). We propose that it implicitly underlies 
the quoted constructions of outward movement that is we take purging, pour-
ing, and emptying as involving vehement motion. These complex uses of the 
Force image schema are metaphoric, as they exploit another source domain, 
one rooted in culturally highly specifi c themes, such as cathartic purgation. 
Dynamic Containment: An Integrated Image Schema for Into Film 
The identifi ed image schemas Centre-Periphery, Container, Source-Path-Goal, 
and Force appeared to intermingle in transparent ways to support the overall 
embodied model of absorption, with key elements of one schema being re-
tained as elements appended to or integrated in another schema. 
Notably, the Centre of the Centre-Periphery schema (the events and [dear-
est] characters) took the role of Goal in the Source-Path Goal schema, a des-
tination in the middle or the deep of the Container, where the viewer’s or the 
reader’s self would be carried into by a Force. Further interpretation of the 
Force schema led us to surmise that the author´s power as well as the destina-
tion itself (being maximally close to narrative events and characters) can also 
induce confl icting resistance in the self. In the end, the viewer or reader may 
have the experience of having been submitted to a superior power; in essence, 
being absorbed while also sensing their own resistance. Viewers may indeed 
be aware of a dynamic balance between attraction and repulsion forces in 
in a most complex construal of their experience of absorption. Our fi nal and 
lengthier quote may help illustrate the point.
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[35] “at this point a little bit pulled back and I’m like okay, I know some-
thing’s going to happen. But it’s also kind of like a self-concern thing 
where I’m trying to watch out for myself, trying to protect myself from 
what I know is about to happen, which is that I’m going to be very 
scared, some crazy stuff’s coming around that won’t make any sense to 
me, but I want it to make sense, I want to try and pay more attention to 
the stuff that happens afterwards. But I know I’m going to have trouble 
with it because it comes so fast, it does pull me in, it pulls me back in at 
certain points, and when I’m pulled in I can’t really pay as much atten-
tion to what’s happening, and so this is all just an attempt to prepare for 
what I know is about to happen.” 
The Container image schema by itself may properly refl ect the construc-
tion of a static end point of the experience, but it defi nitively fails to convey 
the dynamics that are also part of that fi nal experience. As we have seen, 
Source-Path-Goal and especially the Force schema needed to be added to Con-
tainment to represent the dynamism of absorption. A lack of dynamic features 
may be a more general limitation of what are now classic image schemas such 
as those introduced by Lakoff and Johnson, as signaled by recent studies in 
cognitive semantics. For instance, Dewell (2005) has pointed at precisely the 
shortcoming of the Container schema that we mentioned. He argues convinc-
ingly that Lakoff and Johnson’s Containment schema falls short in incorporat-
ing the dynamics that led to the fi nal static containment, even though traces 
of these are part of common structuring of relevant experiences. Dewell’s 
Dynamic Containment image schema seems quite fi t to integrate the experi-
ences reported in this study and do justice to the interplay of forces that lead 
to being absorbed in the story world. Figure 6 presents the Dynamic Contain-
ment schema. It consists of an Entry and an Enclosure event. The construction 
of Entry is always part of experiences of Containment. If we discover that a 
box contains an object, it is not only construed as having a static location in 
relation to an outside, but also there is an immediate awareness of the object 
having entered into the Container at some time. In addition, Dewell (2005) ar-
gues that Containers need not to be rigid three-dimensional shapes; they can 
also have fl exible boundaries, for example bags and sacks. Some Containers 
have receptacles, for which a hand holding an object is the paramount exam-
ple. Such shapes are typically experienced as actively enclosing the object by 
bending and closing in on the object and on itself, see the dashed arrows in Fig-
ure 6. English verbs according to Dewell (2005) describe the image “as . . . grab, 
grasp, catch, enclose, or surround.” As we have seen, similar verbs were used to 
describe experiences of absorption in narrative and fi lm (e.g., in [18]–[21]). The 
experience of being absorbed in a fi ctional narrative could thus be constructed 
in a most effi cient manner using the Dynamic Containment image schema as 
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The Dynamic Containment image 
schema is ideal for capturing a Dynamic 
Balance between experienced Enclosure 
forces and counterforces emanating 
from the viewer’s and reader’s self.
Figure 6. Construal 
of Experience of 
Absorption Using 
Dynamic Contain-
ment Image Schema. 
Adapted from Dewell 
(2005).
the viewer’s or reader’s self having entered the story-world and being enclosed 
in it due to an active Force. We believe that the dynamics of Containment also 
include an awareness of a future or possible exit, accommodating the tendency 
experienced by at least some recipients to fl ee from the grip of the narrative 
or the author. Moreover, viewer or reader resistance to Enclosure could also 
be represented within the same image schema as Forces emanating from the 
self that counter enclosure through the Container’s receptacles. An example of 
such instances might be (the prospect of) situations in the story-world which 
repel the reader (see [30], [31]). Such specifi c resistances could be represented 
as curved dashed arrows parallel to the enclosure forces, but pointing towards 
the Container receptacles or boundaries instead of to the self. 
Finally, we believe that the Dynamic Containment image schema is ideal 
for capturing a Dynamic Balance between experienced Enclosure forces and 
counterforces emanating from the viewer’s and reader’s self. This is construed 
as a compromise between forces, resulting in the self settling on a temporary 
destination in the story-world. The viewer/ reader has resisted the author’s 
Force and then surrendered to it (e.g., [31]). The 
perfect sense is used to capture the essence of 
Dynamic Balance. It is a balance between forces 
and counterforces rather than absence of forces.
Discussion
What Is It Like to Be Absorbed in a Narrative?
We identifi ed a number of image schemata in interviewee construals of the 
experience of being absorbed in a fi ctional narrative. Combining one person’s 









construal with another’s we arrived at an image schematic experiential model 
of absorption summarized as Dynamic Containment (see Figure 6). Summa-
rizing the model in words, the viewer’s or reader’s self travels into the center of 
the narrative, the story-world it portrays. The self wants to be there, exerting 
force, and is taken there in some cases notably by the author. Confl icting ten-
dencies may or may not arise. In the former case the self pushes towards the 
exit, while another force, possibly the author, pulls it back.
Related Work
We believe that the observed construction of absorption in fi ctional narrative is 
consistent with an account of narrative as a simulation (Mar and Oatley 2008; 
see also Tan et al. forthcoming). We believe that construals betray a partial 
awareness of the mechanism. Simulation seems to be experienced, fi rst of all, 
as being absorbed into another reality. In some cases the instance responsible 
for one’s interaction with narrative world may be part of the experience, pointing 
at the possibility that the simulation as such can be accessible to introspection.
The observed image schemata are related to previously proposed concep-
tualizations of narrative absorption. First, they are at the basis of conceptu-
alizations of absorption used in media psychology for the construction of 
instruments capturing typical states of engagement with narrative. Contain-
ment seems to underlie “presence” (Slater et al. 1994), while “transportation” 
(Gerrig 1993; Green and Brock 2000) refl ects schemas Source-Path-Goal and 
Force. This is not surprising as we used the analysis of these experiential con-
cepts to orient the initial search for image schemata. Second, the most con-
spicuous similarities of the model seem to us those with Ryan’s (2001) account 
of the phenomenology of immersion as “being in” the narrative. A difference in 
degree is that reference to the self’s activity in manipulating the procedures of 
narration and co-creation of the narrative as an artefact were less prominent 
than expected if the interviewee were immersed in the narrative rather than 
the story-world. Participants in the current study made no mention of any par-
ticular image schema for such reference. Construals of absorption in the arte-
fact merit quite another analysis which in fact will be reported in Bálint and 
Hakemulder (forthcoming). 
Image Schemata and Beyond: Cognition and Affect in Narrative Absorption
In answer to the question how people construct the experience of being ab-
sorbed in fi ctional narratives (cinematic or print), we found that use is made 
of general mental models that highlight key experiential features of routine 
interactions with things and events in the world. The shared “language of 
experience” seemed to provide the means for constructing people’s experi-
ences in a compact fashion and in a manner most accessible to the listener. 
We conclude that resulting construals appeared to make use of image sche-
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mas, and refl ect the essential non-propositional dimensions of these (Johnson 
1987). First, construals were found to be spatial. The experience of absorption 
involves positioning the self within a three-dimensional spatial framework 
as subject to Containment. Second, construals were found to be embodied. 
Containment refl ected the image of the self’s body being both constrained in 
terms of position and movement, and subject to an origin of forces. The use 
of the Centre-Periphery schema defi ned the body as the center of the world, 
Source-Path-Goal involved trajectories of the bodies through space, and Forces 
were exerted on the self’s body in the fi rst place. Third, construals exhibited 
dynamism. The most encompassing model of the construals features spatial 
transitions across time brought about partly by opposite forces. 
Spatial, embodied, and dynamic features lend cognitive structure to the 
narrative experience drawing from the realm of physics as a source domain. 
However given our aim to assess the use of image schemata in the construal of 
absorbing or gripping experiences, the question arises whether and how affect 
is represented in the construals. Moreover, given the present state of scholarly 
knowledge on the experience of narrative fi lm it would be incredible if affect 
would not be a key element of the reported experiences (see, e.g., Carroll 1999; 
Grodal 1999, 2009; Plantinga 2009; Smith 2011; Tan 1996). We did indeed fi nd 
distinctly affective qualities to the experience as reported by the interviewees, 
but these were not represented through one of the image schemata introduced 
by Lakoff and Johnson. We believe that in the construal of these metaphorical 
projections took place of elements from physics-inspired image schemata onto 
the affective domain. As we have seen, the experience of story-world events and 
characters as the (affectively positive) entities that really mattered was given 
shape by metaphorically mapping physical distance from events and charac-
ters on to a desire to be with these (“closer to the character”), and mapping 
Goal or destination on to a desirability of settling in the midst of story-world 
events and characters.7 The interviews in this study can be analyzed exploring 
the use of space, brightness and size schemata, in future studies of emotional 
experience construals. It would seem from the currently identifi ed examples 
that Force as a physical and embodied source schema, too, is apt to be meta-
phorically mapped on to targeted emotional intensity. If so, it would constitute 
an example of an emotion metaphor proposed by Kövecses (2000)—emotion 
is a mechanical force—exemplifi ed in our case by “drew me in”, or “dragged me 
in.” Filling in further details of the representation going beyond the Gestalt na-
ture of the Force image schema also adds to affective aspects of absorption 
through embodied simulations of feeling (“hooks in my chest”). 
The most general way in which image schemata were used to construe 
affective experiences was the fact that the viewer’s and reader’s self played 
the lead role in the image schemata. The experience was not of something 
being contained but of the self being in a container. Technically speaking the 
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self is mapped onto the trajectory role in image schemata like Source-Path-
Goal, Container and Center-Periphery and subject to or origin of Force. On top 
of these affective qualities of the self’s trajectory into the story-world, at least 
in some cases, a rather basic affective relation transpired through construals, 
namely when a Force behind the viewer’s trajectory was mapped onto the 
persona of the author. Affective qualities of the relation between the viewer’s 
self and the author were highlighted by metaphorically mapping the author’s 
physical power and the viewer being its physical object onto the latter’s feel-
ing of helplessness (“Where is he taking me?”). 
We believe that the Dynamic Containment schema is excellently suited for a 
rich set of metaphorical mappings onto the affective experience of absorption. 
Because of its complete, overview-like representation of the interplay of a vari-
ety of Forces, it allows for a number of ways to zoom in on particular emotional 
experiences spawning a metaphor apt to each one. Here the modelling of con-
struals goes beyond the traditional image schema framework. Dynamic Con-
tainment does not only represent dynamics in story or real world scenes, but 
as Dewell (2005) implies it can act as a blueprint for dynamic simulations of an 
experience, as an ongoing process. In the process viewers and readers zoom in 
on one or other aspect of the constructed experience retrieving or playing from 
memory their perceptions, bodily feelings and affective reactions. This model 
fi ts in more recent conceptualizations of the reconstruction of embodied expe-
riences. Here we have to mention especially Barsalou’s (1999) perceptual sim-
ulation theory as it seems to set image schemas within a more encompassing 
psychological view of the embodied construction of experiences.8
Limitations of the Study
Image Schema
The reference set of image schemata from Lakoff, Johnson, and Dewell obviously 
has its limitations in qualifying the experience of absorption. Although we are 
struck by the range and depth of the experience as it could be construed using 
these, we did not consider alternative mental models, for instance embodied 
schemata comprising experiences with other sensory modalities such as sound, 
taste, touch, and smell, although we hinted at the possibility to consider these 
as details specifying the mental model beyond the image schema as a Gestalt.
We have not explicitly categorized the mental models that we identifi ed 
as metaphors. However, image schemas as they are commonly conceived of 
(e.g., Johnson 1987) are metaphors. That is they map a source domain onto a 
target from another domain. Image schemas are used to map concrete bodily 
and spatial experiences onto more abstract concepts, and this is how they are 
used in construing absorption, as we hope we showed. In the reports of the 
use of particular image schemas, we also noted instances of metaphorical ex-
tension. Some construals testifi ed to building on a given image schema “A,” 
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another image schema or a concept “B” from another (embodied) source do-
main. However, an important limitation is that we did not consider the use of 
conventional cultural metaphors. Such alternative instruments for construing 
absorption experiences are in need of further study. It would seem to us that 
the interview data that we used can also be analyzed from such complemen-
tary model perspectives. Finally, the data may also be analyzed to identify im-
age schemata other than those used for constructing absorption. As one of 
our reviewers suggested, other mental models may be used in construals of 
cognitive or knowledge-related experiences (for instance the conceptual met-
aphor Understanding Is Seeing; Lakoff and Johnson 1980) and such models 
may be intimately related to experiences of absorption.
Narrative Media: Text and Film(s)
A possible limitation of the study is that participants related their absorbing 
experiences in response to either narrative fi lms or written stories. A sepa-
rate detailed analysis of the interviews could shed a more conclusive light in 
the issue on the media specifi city of absorption. However, in going through all 
protocols we were struck by the absence of differences. That is the image sche-
mata that we identifi ed ran across the experiences with both media. Although 
the details of their construals did refer to either language or moving image 
cues, specifi c experiences of being absorbed were cast in the same mental 
models, to the point where we decided to drop the distinction between the 
stimuli from the analysis. Obviously a single study such as this can only hint at 
similarity of absorption experiences across media, but we would suggest that 
our case testifi es to the use of one multimodal “language of experience” for 
construing what it is like to be absorbed in a narrative. Nonetheless it seems 
obvious that when similar image schemata are being used, the content of con-
struals may differ from one medium to another, and more so than this analysis 
has demonstrated. Other scholars have already pointed at differences. Ryan 
(2001) dealt with differences in immersive experiences afforded by the use of 
interactive virtual reality media on the one hand and narrative texts on the 
other. Rogers (2013) in her critical analyses of the experience of new fi lm tech-
nologies pointed at the different phenomenology of absorption in digital fi lm, 
widescreen and 3D fi lms, highlighting experiences of attraction and repulsion, 
and adding, it seems to us an image schema for “internalization” where the 
viewer construes images being projected inside their mind. 
(Re-)construction of Experience
We have used verbalizations of what it is like to be absorbed in a story treating 
these as reconstructions of an experience in the fi rst place. Participants told us 
about what they went through at an earlier time when watching or reading 
a narrative. A possible limitation then is that the reconstruction is not true to 
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the original experience. However, this threat to validity is limited by the fact 
that interviewees had direct access to the fi lm or story fragment they reported 
their experience of. They often did not distinguish between an original and a 
present experiences, using present tense throughout the retelling. Obviously, 
we could not make out when retold experiences were in some way mashed up 
with recollected ones. Our methodological starting point in the analyses was 
is that the reports accounted for construals and thus refl ected the process 
of construction of experiences, rather than a kind of root memories of these. 
For instance, we believe that participants did not so much remember image 
schemata as models of their previous experience; instead the schemas were 
piecemeal retrieved from memory and used on the spot to build a mental 
representation of the experience. On this view, the difference between con-
struction and reconstruction is gradual rather than categorical. It should be 
added that the particular construals that we analyzed did not only serve the 
structuring of experience itself, but also to communicate the experience to 
the researcher-interviewer. Thus it may be argued that the use of image sche-
mata is a by-product of the social situation, requiring representations that 
can be easily grasped by a listener. However, we feel that image schemata be-
cause of their embodied and Gestalt-like nature can be used both for privately 
structuring one’s experience and conveying it to others. And indeed in some 
conceptualizations of consciousness, experience is structured as an outcome 
of a narration by the self to imaginary others (e.g., Oatley’s [2007] “Meadean” 
consciousness, so dubbed following George Herbert Mead’s theory of the es-
sentially social self). Within such a conception, the interview situation would 
allow for experiences to be constructed in a dialogue, somehow intensifying 
or crystallizing out what it would be in private.
A related limitation of the used interview method is in its verbal nature. A 
very concrete threat to the validity of results and our interpretations is that 
the identifi ed image schemata were an artefact of the use of language in self-
reports that were our data. Because cognitive linguists have used verbal cues 
as the primordial evidence of the existence and operation of image schemata, 
it seems possible that the emergence of these images in self-reports was in-
herent in their use of language, while the actual construal of experience in-
volved quite different mental models or structures, for instance Barsalou’s 
(1999) perceptual simulators. This threat to validity is constrained we believe 
by the credibility of a basic claim made by cognitive linguists and cognitive 
psychologists that image schemata are pre-conceptual and acquired before 
the use of language.9 Nonetheless we feel that additional research of constru-
als of the experience of narrative absorption using non-verbal instruments for 
capturing it is both necessary and possible. There are already examples of stud-
ies using computer interfaces for drawing representation and manipulating 
graphic models of image schemas (Richardson et al. 2001). We can also think 
N A R R A T I V E  A B S O R P T I O N  E X P E R I E N C E S  /  8 3
of interview studies like ours recording gestures along with speech, allowing 
for analyses like the one in the opening quote of this article (“both hands push 
down a large round object”). It also seems feasible to assist test participants 
watching a movie or reading a story in real-time construal, by providing them 
with a fl exible 3D object model of the Dynamic Force schema as in Figure 6 
that they can manipulate with their hands, say a semi-transparent elastic bag 
with objects inside attached to the inside of the bag through rubber straps.
Selection of Participants and Narrative Titles
Finally, this empirical account of the use of image schemata in construals of 
absorption in narrative is constrained by features of the particular participants 
and the particular narrative contents they had selected. Participants were se-
lected for the study because of their affi nity with fi lm or literature and their 
ability to relate on their experience. Higher level of education ensured report-
ing capabilities, whereas the long-list of title preferences testifi ed to special 
affi nity for literary narrative and art house fi lm. Only larger scale studies re-
cruiting from larger audiences can shed light on the implications of the current 
selection. However we would argue that such shared and pre-lingual mental 
models as image schemata observed in this study may be of use in virtually 
everyone’s construals of narrative experiences, although individual and sub-
cultural varieties can still abound. The same would go for an objection with re-
gards to the selection of narrative titles. Narratives from different genres and 
individual titles within genres may invoke a wide variety of construals, but we 
speculate that there will be some basic communality underlying these. They 
would include the Source-Path-Goal schema for representing transition of the 
self from being in the real world to being contained in a story-world while 
subject to Forces. It is in the Dynamic Balance experienced at the Goal location 
that we would expect title (or genre) and individual differences to show up. 
The particular interplay of forces such as Attraction and Repulsion may differ 
greatly for one title (genre) and person compared to others.10 As this study may 
illustrate, studying the experience of particular titles by particular individuals 
is not only feasible but also necessary for a better and richer understanding of 
absorption and its varieties.
Determinants of Narrative Absorption
A fi nal shortcoming of the study is due to its very scope and approach. As stated 
at the outset, the reported study deals with the contents of the experience of 
absorption, and not with stimulus features responsible for it. We cannot ex-
plain what the causes are of the use of identifi ed image schemas. The data col-
lection was geared towards probing deeply into the experience of absorption. 
In the interviews participants were instructed and encouraged to introspect 
on their experience. As a consequence, they did not focus on fi lm or textual 
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features assumed to be responsible for the particular experience, such as sty-
listic details or narrative procedures. Such an analytic attitude would need to 
be induced in future studies aiming to identify causes in the fi lm stimulus 
of absorption. Obviously, causes and mechanisms underlying the experience 
or its construction using image schemata, could best be addressed in exper-
imental research, systematically varying narrative and fi lm features.11 Such 
experiments may be informed, on the one hand, by available analyses of nar-
rative and fi lm features that are analytically associated with image schemas 
and embodied metaphors (e.g., Coëgnarts and Kravanja 2014a; Fahlenbrach 
2008; and Forceville 2006). On the other hand, mechanisms that contribute 
to smooth embodied simulation of story events, hinted at in the introduction, 
could be taken as a starting point for experimental tests. For instance nar-
rative procedures like condensation and focalization, or stylistic ones such as 
continuity editing may be manipulated in order to observe effects on atten-
tion, processing fl uency and absorption.
Conclusion
To conclude, we have identifi ed the use of a general class of self-oriented em-
bodied mental models for the qualifi cation of absorption in a fi ctional narra-
tive. The fi ndings are in line with accounts of narrative as simulations running 
on the mind and body of recipients. What they add to this current understand-
ing of the narrative experience is an immediate account of what it is like to 
get absorbed “into fi lm” or a book. The account points to the embodied and 
personal nature of narrative absorption as a reason for its attractiveness.
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Notes
1 The names of the authors are in alphabetical order. The project Varieties of Absorp-
tion this article reports on was funded by the Netherlands Organization for Scientifi c Re-
search (No. 360-30-203). We would like to thank for Brendan Rooney’s assistance in the 
proofreading. 
2 The fi lm experience according to some theorists is basically paradoxical as it couples 
apparent realism with cues that seem to contradict realism (e.g., Arnheim 1933; Bazin 1967; 
Michotte 1948).
3 Anderson (1996) proposed that perceptual affordances presented by the moving image 
are similar to those afforded by the real world, and this similarity makes for apparent reality. 
Grodal (2009) elaborated the role of general neural systems in viewer responses to fi lm that 
are similar to responses to real world scenes.
4 Another mental model for high-intensity experiences of being absorbed not in the sto-
ry-world but in the narrative as an aesthetic artifact, “Foregrounding,” was also proposed as 
a complement to “Into Film.” This type of absorption is not analyzed in this article (see Bálint 
and Hakemulder forthcoming). In a similar vein Ryan (2001) distinguished immersion in the 
represented world, which is associated with the recipient’s attention to the represented, 
from engagement in the narrative as an artefact associated with attending to and manipu-
lating the means it creates meaning by.
5 The Source-Path-Goal schema’s label is abbreviated to Path in Johnson (1987). The full 
name appears in later work by Johnson and others, see Hampe and Grady (2005). 
6 The Force schema is extensively discussed by Johnson (1987: 126) under this name al-
though it is redubbed Counterforce in his list of major schemata. 
7 In line with this proposal Crawford (2009) has shown that distance to desirability map-
ping is a quite common procedure in emotion metaphors. She has suggested that not only 
the embodied experience of distance but also of space, brightness, and size are effectively 
used to emphasize aspects of emotion because the target, emotion, is by itself already a 
pervasively embodied concept.
8 On this account the use of mental models, for example, in (re-)constructing an ex-
perience involves an embodied simulation that draws on perceptual simulators retrieved 
from memory for the simulation. Simulators have been, so to speak, recorded from percep-
tual experiences, so that they retain their original sensory and affective qualities (see also 
Barsalou et al.2003). Thus they go beyond the Gestalt-like representation typical of image 
schemata.
9 See, for example, Mandler (2012) for a nuanced discussion of the use of Containment, 
Path-Goal and a precursor of Force in children under eight months.
10 For a recent proposal on how genre-related forms of narration give rise to differential 
narrativizing activity and related embodied experiences see Kiss (forthcoming).
11 About the narrative determinants of absorption see, for example, Bálint et al. (2014); 
and Doicaru et al. (forthcoming).
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